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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the likely impact of a proposed formula apportionment system for corporation 
tax in the EU on the inbound investment of US multinational companies. We pay attention to tax 
planning strategies that may be employed by US multinationals and investigate whether effective tax 
rates in Europe of US companies differ from those of European companies. The proposal is for an 
optional system: we estimate the extent to which both European and US companies would be likely 
to choose it taking into account their existing structures and future investment incentives. The 
relative position of US and European companies depends crucially on the taxation of foreign passive 
income.  
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
This paper forms part of the research funded partly by the ESRC under grant RES-060-25-0033, and 
partly by donations by companies listed on the website of the Centre for Business Taxation. We 
thank Jeff Brown for encouragement to address the issues in the paper. We thank Jeff, Will Morris, 
Doug Shackelford and participants at the HMRC / Centre for Business Taxation workshop in 
September 2011 and the Tax Policy and the Economy conference in October 2011 for helpful 
comments. The research and opinions are those of the authors only. 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
For several years the European Commission has been considering how to create a harmonized 
system of corporation tax within the EU. A formal proposal was finally made in March 2011.1
 
 The 
proposal is to implement a “common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)”. The Commission 
announced that aim of the proposal is  
“[...] to significantly reduce the administrative burden, compliance costs and legal uncertainties 
that businesses in the EU currently face in having to comply with up to 27 different national 
systems for determining their taxable profits. The proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB) would mean that companies would benefit from a "one-stop-shop" system for filing 
their tax returns and would be able to consolidate all the profits and losses they incur across the 
EU. Member States would maintain their full sovereign right to set their own corporate tax rate. 
The Commission estimates that, every year, the CCCTB will save businesses across the EU €700 
million in reduced compliance costs, and €1.3 billion through consolidation. In addition, 
businesses looking to expand cross-border will benefit from up to €1 billion in savings. The CCCTB 
will also make the EU a much more attractive market for foreign investors.“2
 
  
Since the CCCTB has been debated for around a decade before becoming a formal proposal, it has 
already received considerable academic attention. Contributions have examined a number of aspects 
of the proposals including the likely effects on incentives3, tax revenues,4 the wider effects on the 
European economy,5 and many aspects of implementation.6
 
 
The aim of this paper is to extend existing research to consider the impact on inbound investment 
into Europe, especially from the USA. This is a far from straightforward exercise. Although there is 
now a considerable literature examining the impact of various measures of effective tax rates on 
                                                          
1 European Commission (2011a). 
2 European Commission (2011b). 
3 For example, Devereux and Loretz (2011). 
4 For example, Fuest et al (2007), Devereux and Loretz (2008). 
5 For example, Bettendorf et al (2010). 
6 For example, Fuest (2008) and the papers in Lang et al (2008). 
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foreign direct investment decisions,7 the construction of such effective tax rates typically requires 
assumptions to be made regarding the form that the investment takes.8 In particular, such measures 
typically do not take into account the tax planning opportunities open to multinational companies. 
An extreme example of such tax planning is the strategy apparently used by Google – known as the 
“Double Irish” and the “Dutch Sandwich” – which, it is alleged, led to the company saving $60 billion 
in tax, and having an overseas tax rate of 2.4 percent.9
  
 To the extent to which companies take into 
account taxes in determining their investment policy, they are presumably concerned with the tax 
that they will actually be liable to pay, and so the extent to which they engage in such strategies is 
likely to affect their decisions about real activities. 
It is not feasible to take all possible tax planning strategies into account in assessing the impact of tax 
reform in the EU. However, in this paper we make some attempt to assess its importance.  We begin 
by investigating indirectly the tax planning strategies currently used by US multinational companies 
when they undertake real investment in Europe. We also compare measures of the effective tax 
rates faced by US companies to those faced by European companies. This makes some contribution 
to the question of the extent to which European taxes differentially affect the competitiveness of US 
companies relative to their European rivals.  
 
We then examine the effect of the proposed reform on US and European companies. Of course, post-
reform it is likely that companies would rearrange their affairs to plan around the new corporate tax 
system in Europe. So it is not valid to make a simple comparison between incentives under the 
existing system taking into account tax planning, with the proposed system in the absence of tax 
planning. However, this paper is not intended to devise and set out tax planning strategies that could 
                                                          
7 See, for example, the survey of De Mooij and Ederveen (2008). 
8 Measures based on ex-post declarations of profit can potentially avoid this problem, but use of such measures 
tends to induce problems of endogeneity.  
9 The tax planning activities by Google involve an Irish company with (for tax purposes) management in 
Bermuda (Double Irish) which routes their profits in royalty payments to Bermuda via a Dutch company (Dutch 
sandwich). See Drucker (2010).  
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be used by US companies after a tax reform in the EU. The paper therefore only considers in very 
broad terms whether the proposed reform would significantly affect tax planning opportunities.  
 
Before examining the position of US companies, it is useful to review the proposed EU reforms. There 
are six aspects of the proposals that are particularly relevant for our purposes. We discuss them in 
turn. 
 
• Harmonization of corporate tax base 
The intention is to harmonize the tax base across all EU member states. Clearly this would represent 
a major reform in all countries. As an example, depreciation allowances are proposed to be based on 
a length of life of buildings of 40 years and for long-life tangible assets other than buildings a life of 
15 years. Other fixed assets would be depreciated at a rate of 25%.10
 
  Most of the proposal is taken 
up with defining the tax base, although a considerable amount of additional detail would be required 
before it could be implemented. There appears to be no intention to institute a radical reform 
compared to existing corporation taxes. For example, interest payments would continue to be 
deductible (subject to anti-abuse rules), and there would be no relief for the costs of equity finance. 
One important element of the proposals is the anti-abuse rules. Currently these differ substantially 
across EU member states, and the existence of such differences to some extent offers both European 
and US companies a menu of options in choosing the location of their activities. For example, Ireland 
has no controlled foreign company (CFC) rules relating to the income of foreign subsidiaries of Irish 
companies, although many other countries do.11
                                                          
10 Compared to the existing tax rules this implies on average significant broadening of the tax base for industrial 
buildings and patents and a moderate change for plant and machinery. However for individual countries the 
picture can be substantially different. See Section 4 and Table 4 a for a more detailed analysis.   
 Some countries – but not all – currently have thin 
capitalization rules that restrict the deductibility of interest. The new proposal includes both a thin 
11 Broadly equivalent to the Sub-part F rules in the USA.  
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capitalization rule and a CFC rule that would apply to all EU member states and which build on the 
varying existing practice in the EU. 
 
• No harmonization of corporate tax rate 
There are no proposals to harmonize corporate tax rates. The intention is that each country would be 
able to apply its own tax rate to the profit allocated to it. In the short run, this may lead to some lack 
of balance in corporate tax systems. Typically it is common for countries to pair a high tax rate with a 
narrow tax base, or a low tax rate with a broad tax base. Harmonizing the base but not the rate 
would upset this pattern, with consequential effects on investment incentives. It is therefore likely 
that in the longer run (or possibly immediately) countries would adjust their tax rates either down or 
up depending on whether the harmonized base was larger or smaller than the existing base. Beyond 
that, there would arguably be even greater pressure of competition in rates between member states.  
At present such competition can also take place over the definition of tax bases, and competition in 
rates is to some extent obscured by differences in bases. This would no longer be true for 
competition in rates under the proposed system. 
 
• Consolidation of corporate tax base across all European subsidiaries 
A key feature of the proposal is the consolidation of profit and loss across all EU member states. This 
has two major implications. The first is that under the proposed system taxable profit would be 
independent of the country in which profit is located. Tax planning arrangements to shift profits 
between European countries would therefore no longer be worthwhile.12 The second is that, with a 
small number of exceptions, companies currently cannot generally offset losses in one country 
against profits in another.13
                                                          
12 Subject to differences in withholding tax rates, discussed below. 
  However, this will be possible, indeed required, under the proposed 
system. Start-up losses encountered on a new investment in another EU country will therefore be 
13 Austria and Denmark do have forms of international loss consolidation. In addition, a ruling by the European 
Court of Justice in Marks & Spencer v. Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes (ECJ Case C-446/03), requires that 
losses can be used in the parent company if there is no possibility of carrying them forward in the subsidiary.  
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treated more favorably than at present for companies that have some existing taxable profit 
somewhere in the EU. But this benefit would not accrue to a US company making its first investment 
in the EU.  
 
• Formula Apportionment 
The proposal has a three equal-factor allocation formula, based on the location of sales, employment 
and assets. The employment factor is further split into two equal factors based on payroll and the 
number of employees. This formula would be common to all countries; there would therefore be no 
opportunity to exploit differences in the formula between countries. The asset factor would be based 
solely on fixed tangible assets; intangible assets would not be used. The sales factor would be based 
on the destination of sales.  
 
As has been well known since at least the contribution of Gordon and Wilson (1986), a corporation 
tax with such an apportionment factor has the effect of a tax on each of the factors. When tax rates 
also differ between countries, then the apportionment can affect the location of activity.  For 
example, companies have an incentive to shift valuable tangible assets to a country with a low tax 
rate. The impact of the sales factor here is less clear, though. A direct sale to a third party customer 
would generate a tax in the location of the customer; this is less likely to affect the location decisions 
of the company itself.14
 
  
• Optional 
Another important feature of the proposal is that the system would be optional for taxpayers. It is 
envisaged that countries would maintain their existing systems and introduce the CCCTB as a 
possible tax system as an option for each group of companies. Tax authorities would be obliged to 
operate two systems simultaneously.  
                                                          
14 There may be an opportunity for companies to route sales via third parties in low tax countries. 
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However, from the perspective of the company, and assuming that the existing combination of bases 
and rates continued to be available in each country, the introduction of an optional new tax would 
create an asymmetric effect: tax liabilities may fall, but presumably companies would not choose the 
CCCTB if they expected tax liabilities to rise. At first sight, then, the introduction of this optional 
system could only reduce tax liabilities and increase incentives to invest, or have no effect; it could 
not worsen investment incentives. However, there may be general equilibrium effects. For example, 
if European companies see a greater advantage than US companies, then US companies may suffer a 
relative disadvantage. We discuss this possibility further below.  
 
• No harmonization of double tax treaties or withholding tax rates 
The Commission’s proposal does not include harmonization of international aspects of taxation, 
except within the EU. Thus each country can choose its own withholding tax rate on cross-border 
payments of dividends, interest and royalties. The Commission proposes that the revenues from 
withholding taxes on interest and royalties are shared according to the apportionment factor. But it 
does not propose to harmonize the rate. In this case, then there may still be an incentive to shift 
profits within EU countries. For example, overall tax may be reduced by having a European holding 
company in a country that does not charge withholding tax on the payment of dividends to a non-EU 
parent company. Shifting profit into that company would not affect the European-wide tax payment 
(unless the apportionment factors were also affected). But it would affect the tax paid on the 
dividend to the non-EU parent. The same would be true for payments of interest and royalties out of 
the EU. The lack of harmonization of these international aspects of tax could therefore be important 
for the tax-minimizing strategies open to, say, US companies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some evidence on the existing 
activities of US multinational companies within the EU. We examine structures used by US companies 
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operating in Europe, and we compare measures of effective tax rates of US and European companies. 
In Section 3 we examine whether the introduction of the CCCTB, at existing tax rates, would induce 
US companies and European companies to choose the CCCTB assuming that existing tax systems 
were still in place as an option. The approach we use here is to apply the rules of the CCCTB to 
existing structures – this therefore does not take into account any tax advantage that could be 
gained by adjusting structures in the light of the CCCTB alternative. This is therefore a form of ex-post 
evaluation: what would tax liabilities have been if the tax system had been consistent with the 
CCCTB, but all investment decisions and structures were as under the actual system? Section 4 
considers an ex-ante analysis in the sense of identifying investment incentives under existing 
systems, and potential incentives under the CCCTB. Section 5 briefly concludes.  
 
 
 
2. How do US companies invest in Europe? 
 
To understand how US firms would be affected by the proposed CCCTB tax reform it is useful to start 
with a description of the existing corporate activities of US firms in the European Union. To this end 
we use the ORBIS dataset provided by Bureau Van Dijk, comprising financial accounts and ownership 
information for 444,934 companies.15
                                                          
15 We restrict the original dataset to companies with either more than 10 million Euros of turnover, 20 million 
Euros of total assets or 150 employees.  
 We are able to allocate 253,158 companies to 109,490 
ultimate corporate owners. Of these companies, 15,586 are subsidiaries ultimately owned by one of 
4,111 US parents. Unfortunately balance sheet and profit and loss account information is only 
available for a substantially smaller number of companies which results in a reduced sample size for 
some of the analysis below. In order to exploit as much of the information as possible we allow the 
sample size to vary between the analyses in the different sections of the paper. A full description of 
the dataset is provided in the Data Appendix. 
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a. Ownership structures of US companies in Europe 
 
A starting point for the analysis of how US companies invest in Europe is to analyze patterns of 
ownership. Post-tax profits arising in any particular subsidiary ultimately flow back to the parent as a 
dividend, which may trigger withholding taxes. Given that withholding taxes on dividends paid to 
non-EU countries vary across EU member states, and also given other differences in the treatment of 
holding companies, US companies may have an incentive to structure their European activities in a 
particular way.  
 
A first look at this is shown in Table 1, which uses the ownership data from ORBIS to construct 
ownership trees for 4,111 US-based multinational companies with a total of 15,586 subsidiaries 
within Europe. Some European subsidiaries of these companies may be owned directly by the US 
parent. Many are instead owned indirectly, via intermediate companies. In the Table we focus on 
cross-border ownership. We ignore companies in one country that are owned directly by another 
company in the same country.  
 
Table 1 reports on the immediate ownership of the resulting 10,090 European subsidiaries of US-
based multinational companies. The table indicates how many companies located in the row country 
are directly owned by companies located in the column country. For example, 115 German 
companies are owned directly by a Netherlands parent, while 831 German companies are owned 
directly by a US parent.16
 
  
Overall, the table indicates that over 70% of these companies are owned directly by a US company 
(7,215 out of 10,090). Of these, one third is located in the UK, with a further 12% in France and 11% 
in Germany. The remaining companies are not owned directly by US companies. By far the largest 
                                                          
16 Some EU countries are excluded from the columns in Table 1 since they host no immediate parent 
companies.  
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host of intermediate European companies is the Netherlands; 970 non-Netherlands subsidiaries have 
direct parent companies in the Netherlands (just under 10% of this group). A further 386 European 
subsidiaries have direct parents outside the EU and the USA. Another country which features 
relatively heavily as a location for parent companies is Luxembourg, which hosts the parents of 191 
non-Luxembourg subsidiaries. 
 
The Table therefore provides mixed evidence. A large majority of European subsidiaries are owned 
directly by US parents. Dividends paid back to those parents may well be subject to US tax, especially 
since the US tax rate tends to exceed most EU tax rates. Of course, dividends may not be paid, and 
instead any profit may be reinvested. However, a considerable proportion of subsidiaries in Europe 
are owned indirectly through another country. Of course, this may be explained for non-tax reasons. 
But it is also possible that the US companies are exploiting particular aspects of EU, non-EU and US 
tax systems by arranging their ownership structure in this way. Particularly, the use of the 
Netherlands seems likely to be related to its relatively favorable tax treatment.  
 
This pattern is remarkably robust to the exclusion of smaller corporate groups. It might be thought 
that the proportion of US companies directly owning a subsidiary in a country might be affected by 
size: larger companies with more sophisticated techniques seem more likely to route investment 
through intermediary countries. However, this is generally not true. For example, excluding all US 
companies with less than 3 European subsidiaries yields a very similar pattern to that shown in Table 
1.  
 
The share of directly-held subsidiaries is remarkably similar for corporate groups with the ultimate 
owner in other countries. Typically, around two thirds of subsidiaries appear to be held directly, 
while the Netherlands and to lesser extent Belgium and Luxembourg make up a disproportionately 
large share of the European holding companies.   
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b. Co-location in Europe of US companies 
 
Ownership structures are important for the flow of profits from subsidiary to parent as a dividend. 
But income can be shifted between different parts of a multinational group using other forms of 
income, such as interest and royalties. In this case, profit shifting opportunities can arise without a 
specific ownership structure in place. For example, if one subsidiary owns the relevant intangible 
assets, then other companies within the group can pay royalties to that subsidiary whatever the 
precise ownership structure. A more general analysis of the location of US multinationals therefore 
needs to identify clusters of countries in which subsidiaries of US companies tend to be located. 
Dyreng et al (2011) take this approach. Specifically, they analyze the location of pairs of subsidiaries. 
They find that certain pairs are more likely to include a tax haven than would be expected by chance, 
that pairs are more likely to form if the host countries share a bilateral tax treaty and less likely to 
form as income and dividend withholding taxes between the countries, and with the US parent, 
increase. 
 
We are interested in the same factors, but take a different approach. First, we identify the location of 
each subsidiary within each US multinational group. The first column in Table 2a shows the number 
of US corporate groups operating in each country. For example, 2,501 (or 60.8 percent of the 4,111 
corporate groups analyzed) are active in the UK. At the other end of the spectrum are small countries 
like Austria and Slovenia with subsidiaries of only 21 (0.5 per cent) and 8 (0.2 per cent) corporate 
groups represented.17
 
 
For each group in each country, we then identify the frequency with each other EU country is also 
part of the overall group. Thus, for example, 50% of US multinational companies that have a 
                                                          
17 The Table suppresses Cyprus with only one corporate group and Malta with no subsidiaries of US corporate  
groups.   
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subsidiary in Belgium also have a subsidiary in the Netherlands, and 78% also have a subsidiary in the 
UK. The last row of the Table presents the weighted mean of the entries in each column, weighted by 
the number of companies in each row. Obviously, we would expect the larger countries to appear 
more frequently since greater economic activity takes place in those countries, and so we would 
expect to see significant numbers of groups with subsidiaries in, say, Germany or the UK. We might 
expect the prevalence of some countries also to depend on cultural and language similarities in the 
US. Both of these factors are reflected in the last row: for example, 75% of US companies with a 
European, but non-UK, subsidiary also have a subsidiary in the UK. 
 
But, relative to their size, some countries do appear to be more prevalent.  For example, just over 
one third of US companies with a European, but non-Netherlands, subsidiary also have a subsidiary in 
the Netherlands. The equivalent number of Belgium is 32%, and for Ireland it is 25%. These 
proportions appear to be large, and may well reflect tax advantages. However, they may also reflect 
other factors.  
 
To explore this further, in Table 2b we make an adjustment for the size of the country, measured by 
GDP. Specifically, for each US group, conditional on the total number of EU countries in which that 
group has at least one subsidiary and conditional on having a subsidiary in country i, we calculate an 
approximation of the probability that the group also has a subsidiary in country j, where the 
probability is based on the contribution of the GDP of country j to EU-wide GDP. Aggregating over US 
groups with different numbers of subsidiaries, we can then generate a prediction of each element of 
Table 2a based on the economic size of each country. Table 2b presents the results of deducting 
those predictions from the actual proportion in Table 2a for each element of the Table. Table 2b 
therefore gives an indication of the extent to which the observed pattern in Table 2a deviates from 
what would be expected, based only on GDP, and conditional on the actual number of subsidiaries. 
The last row presents weighted averages, as in Table 2a. 
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Correcting for incentives due to differences in GDP, Table 2b presents a rather different picture. For 
example, Table 2a reveals that 49% of US companies with an EU, but non-German, subsidiary also 
have a subsidiary in Germany. Table 2b shows that, abstracting from the incentive to be present in 
Germany because it has a large GDP, US companies are likely to avoid locating a subsidiary in 
Germany (virtually all the entries in the Germany column are negative). There remains a prevalence 
for locating in the UK, which could reflect cultural and language similarities to the US. Apart from the 
UK, the most popular countries in Table 2b are Belgium, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Netherlands. Obviously non-tax factors may be important in determining location decisions; but the 
inclusion of Ireland and the Netherlands in this list is certainly consistent with a degree of tax 
planning. 
 
c. European effective tax rates for US companies 
 
The analysis so far has represented an indirect attempt to infer the extent to which US companies 
engage in tax planning when they undertake real investment in the Europe. The evidence is mixed. A 
large majority of US companies do not use an intermediary company when investing in Europe. 
However, a sizable minority tend to have holding companies in countries such as the Netherlands, or 
outside of the EU. There is also evidence that corporate groups have more subsidiaries in tax-favored 
countries such as the Netherlands and Ireland than would be expected by the size of their 
economies.  
 
A more direct question is whether US companies succeed in paying relatively low rates of tax on their 
activities in Europe, and whether they appear to face a competitive advantage or disadvantage 
relative to European companies. We do not directly observe tax payments. However, we are able to 
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extract information on the tax charged to the profit and loss account for a subsample of companies 
using the ORBIS dataset. Using this as a basis, we are able to construct backward-looking measures of 
effective tax rates for any subsidiary or for the corporate group as a whole. We focus on the latter, 
and compare effective tax rates across groups according to the location of the parent company.  
 
The construction of effective tax rates is not straightforward. For each group we sum all tax charges 
for all subsidiaries for up to a ten year period to 2010 (we use fewer years when the subsidiary does 
not exist for the entire period, or where data is not available for all ten years). Analyzing the position 
over a ten year period should mean that the importance of the difference between the tax charge in 
the profit and loss statement and the tax actually paid is much less important, since timing 
differences tend to cancel out in the longer run. 
 
To compare these tax charges, we define effective tax rates by scaling by a measure of profit. We 
consider two measures. 18
 
 The first is EBIT (earnings before interest and tax). Although this is not a 
direct estimate of taxable profit this nevertheless is an interesting benchmark, precisely because it is 
before tax-deductible interest payments, and hence before one of the measures that companies can 
take to reduce tax liabilities in a particular jurisdiction. The second is profit and loss before tax (PLBT), 
measured after interest payments (and receipts). If a company that pays interest from a subsidiary in 
a high-tax rate EU country to another member of the group in a low tax-rate EU country, then the 
aggregate values of both measures of profit should in principle be unaffected. However, the tax 
charge will be lower, reflecting the difference in tax rates in the two countries. A company that pays 
interest to any other party (another subsidiary outside the EU, or simply to a third party) would 
generate a higher tax-to-PLBT ratio than tax-to-EBIT ratio.  
                                                          
18 We have also considered a third measure as the ratio of the tax charge to gross profit; the denominator here 
should reflect profit before royalties are deducted. Companies that pay high royalties may have a very low 
effective tax rate on this measure though not necessarily on the other measures. We have fewer observations 
for this measure. However, the results using this measure are very similar to those using the other two 
measures. 
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All measures of effective tax rates ultimately reflect the difference between the measure of 
accounting profit used and taxable profit. Since standard measures also depend on the statutory tax 
rate, it is useful also to analyze this difference directly. To do so, we simply scale up the tax charge by 
the local statutory tax rate in order to generate a measure of taxable profit for each subsidiary. We 
then aggregate the measure of taxable profit across time and subsidiaries and scale by the aggregate 
values of the two accounting measures of profit.  
 
To summarize, we define four measures as:  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐽𝑖𝑗=12009𝑡=2000
∑ ∑ 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1
2009
𝑡=2000
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐽𝑖𝑗=12009𝑡=2000
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1
2009
𝑡=2000
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂1 = ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡/𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐽𝑖𝑗=12009𝑡=2000
∑ ∑ 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1
2009
𝑡=2000
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂2 = ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡/𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐽𝑖𝑗=12009𝑡=2000
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1
2009
𝑡=2000
 
where 𝜏 denotes the statutory corporate tax rate (including local profit taxes), 𝐽𝑖 denotes the total 
number of subsidiaries of corporate group 𝑖. When constructing our effective tax rate measures we 
exclude all corporate groups for which the numerator is negative.  
 
We also construct an unweighted statutory tax rate for each company based on the location of its 
component subsidiaries, as  
𝜏𝑖 = ∑ ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐽𝑖𝑗=12009𝑡=2000𝐽𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑗  
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗 describes the number of years we can observe subsidiary 𝑗. These measures tend to 
generate a number of outliers. We exclude observations where the values of the first two measures 
lie outside the range zero to 70 percent, or where the values of the last two measures lie outside the 
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range of zero to 2. Additionally we exclude all firms for which the average debt to total assets ratio 
exceeds 1.  
 
Table 3 presents a summary of these measures, listed according to the location of the ultimate 
parent company. Note, of course, that these figures represent only taxes paid in Europe. They do not 
include any further tax paid in the USA, or in any other country.  On average, groups have an 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 of just over 28 percent and an 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇 of nearly 32 percent. The higher latter figure 
reflects a net payment of interest to parties that are not EU members of the same group. This 
difference between the two measures holds for all groups, whatever the location of the ultimate 
parent company, with one exception: the USA. This seems to indicate that, on average, subsidiaries 
of US groups do not pay interest to third parties, though they may pay interest to each other in order 
to shift their taxable profit within the EU, and of course the parent may borrow in the US. If European 
subsidiaries of US companies were following a strategy of paying interest from high-tax European 
countries to low-tax European countries, this would tend to reduce their consolidated 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇. 
Table 3 presents some evidence that, on average, US groups do have lower values than European 
companies.  
 
To abstract from tax rate differences, columns 3 and 4 show estimated taxable profit as a proportion 
of EBIT (column 3) and PLBT (column 4). Again, as expected, the ratios in column 4 tend to be higher 
since net interest paid is positive, reducing PLBT below EBIT, and on average the proportionate rise 
from column 3 to column 4 matches that from column 1 to column 2. However, again this is not true 
for companies that are part of US groups, for whom the two ratios in columns 3 and 4 are very 
similar.  
 
In fact, US companies tend to have a higher ratio of taxable profit to EBIT than European companies, 
but a slightly lower ratio of taxable profit to PLBT. This suggests that, like European companies, US 
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companies have a taxable profit close to their PLBT. However, unlike European companies they do 
not reach this position by paying interest to third parties.  
 
We take this analysis one step further in Table 4, which considers how various factors determine the 
different ETR measures. Here we regress each of the ETR measures on a number of variables. We are 
particularly interested whether corporate groups with a US company as the ultimate owner differ 
with respect to their effective tax burden. We identify this effect with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the corporate group has a US owner.19
 
 To control for the location of companies we include a 
full set of dummy variables for whether the group has a subsidiary in each country and we also 
include the subsidiary-weighted statutory tax rate for the corporate group. Finally we include a full 
set of sector dummies (in the interests of space the coefficients on these variables are not reported). 
We control for firm size, which we measure by (the logarithm) of total assets. The theoretical 
prediction for the impact of firm size on the effective tax burden is ambiguous. A longstanding 
debate in the accounting literature is whether larger firms face a higher burden because they are 
under more scrutiny from the governments (cf. Zimmermann (1983) or Omer et. al (1993)) or 
whether larger firms can exploit their larger resources to reduce their tax burden.20
 
  We find robust 
evidence that larger companies have lower effective tax rates. They also tend to have a lower ratio of 
taxable profit to the two measures of accounting profit. This suggests that they are able to reduce 
their Europe-wide taxable profit, rather than simply shifting it between European countries.  
With respect to our main variable of interest, companies with a US parent generally tend to have a 
higher effective tax rates than European companies. This does not appear to be solely due to 
operating in higher-taxed countries, since controlling for the tax rate – either by including it as a 
                                                          
19 We have also examined regressions with a complete set of similar ultimate ownership dummy variables 
representing the different countries in which the ultimate parent company could be located. However, 
including these other dummies has little impact on the results since for the large part of the sample the parent 
country is the same as the country of the subsidiaries. 
20 See also Rego (2003) for a more comprehensive summary of this literature.  
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separate regressor, or by considering only the ratios of taxable to accounting profit - does not 
remove this effect. It is possible that this effect could be due to higher profitability of US companies. 
Apart from this, it would appear that US companies are less able to manage their tax affairs in 
Europe.  
 
However, it is possible that some firms may be more sophisticated in managing their tax affairs. To 
investigate this we include an interaction term between the US-owner dummy and a dummy for 
whether the group has a subsidiary in the Netherlands. Conditional on the other effects discussed, 
the coefficient on this interaction term is of the opposite sign, but roughly of the same magnitude, as 
the effect of the US dummy. This suggests that the high effective tax rates faced by US companies 
apply only to those that are relatively unsophisticated in their tax planning (i.e. not having a Dutch 
subsidiary). However, it also implies that sophisticated tax planning techniques by US companies 
apparently do not generally lead to them facing lower tax effective tax rates in Europe than European 
companies. 
 
However, it is also plausible that larger companies engage in more sophisticated tax-planning 
strategies. To examine this we further interact the interaction variable (indicating a US company with 
a Netherlands subsidiary) with our measure of firm size. On including this term, the coefficient on the 
original interaction term becomes significantly positive, while the variable interacting it with firm size 
is highly significant and negative. Interpreting these two coefficients together this would indicate 
that only larger firms benefit from a lower effective tax burden because of tax planning strategies 
involving a Dutch subsidiary. Broadly, there is a positive effect for companies below 12 million of 
total assets for the measures based on EBIT and 35 million of total assets for the measure based on 
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pre-tax profits, and a negative effect for those above these amounts.21
 
 Further exploring this effect 
lies beyond the scope of the current paper and is an issue for future research.  
In sum, a careful analysis of the data generates results that are not consistent with the popular view 
that sophisticated tax planning operations of US companies – such as the Google example identified 
earlier – allow these companies pay low effective rates of tax in Europe. It is much more likely that 
companies differ - amongst others criteria with respect to their size - in the extent of their tax 
planning activities. Given this heterogeneity, it is interesting to study in more detail the likely impact 
of tax reform in the EU on the incentives faced by these companies. 
 
 
 
3. Would US companies choose the CCCTB if their activities were unchanged? 
 
The initial question for understanding the likely effects of EU tax reform on inward investment by US 
companies is whether these companies would opt into the new system, or would prefer to remain 
paying tax under the existing systems. In general this depends on the extent to which the companies 
rearrange their businesses in the light of the tax reform. They may invest more or less, change the 
location of their investment, and engage in different tax planning operations. Allowing for all of these 
factors would require a sophisticated general equilibrium model. We do not follow that route. 
Instead we undertake a more basic analysis. We aim to identify the tax liabilities that companies 
would have faced if the tax reform had taken place 8 years ago but companies had exactly the same 
operations. That is, we aim to identify what tax liabilities of groups of companies would have been 
                                                          
21 Dividing the coefficients for the dummy and the interaction terms yields 0.141/0.015=9.4 for the logarithm of 
total assets, which corresponds to 12 million Euros in absolute value.  
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assuming no behavioral change. This approach should generate a minimum bound on the proportion 
of companies that would choose to be taxed under the CCCTB.22
 
   
We therefore approach this question by taking as given the location of subsidiaries and their 
accounting information, including investment, employment, sales and profit. The need for more 
accounting information in this exercise necessitates a reduction in the size of the sample, since 
relevant data is missing for a number of companies in the samples used above. We consider only 
companies that operate in more than one EU country.23
 
 We proceed by making adjustments to the 
corporation tax charge in the accounts, in a number of steps. 
a. First, we derive a measure of taxable profits and losses , accounting for loss carry forwards 
included in the corporation tax charge in the accounts.  
b. Second, we consolidate the profits and losses of subsidiaries that are in the same group 
within the EU, to generate a measure of EU-wide taxable profit. 
c. Third, we allocate this taxable profit to individual countries based on the proposed CCCTB 
allocation formula. This is essentially a three-way split between tangible assets, 
employment and sales. 
d. Fourth, we apply the existing statutory tax rate in each country to estimate the tax liability 
in each country. We then aggregate tax liabilities to estimate of the total tax liability for 
each group, and compare that with the liability under the existing system.     
 
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5. We analyze 5,413 corporate groups. The first 
column shows the number of groups with an ultimate parent company in each country. Due to low 
                                                          
22 This analysis updates that of Devereux and Loretz (2008), and identifies in particular the effects of the reform 
on companies with parent companies in specific countries.  
23 This implies a reduction in the number of corporate groups to 5,413 and in the number of subsidiaries to 
42,288. In sum our analysis is based on 217,848 observations, which implies that we observe each subsidiary 
for 5.15 years on average. Unfortunately we have only 30 companies based in Ireland with usable data. These 
may not be representative. 
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numbers, we combine groups from the new member states, and from non-EU countries. We show 
the case for US companies separately. The second column shows the proportion of these groups that 
we estimate would see a reduction in their aggregate tax liability under the CCCTB assuming 
unchanged behavior. Overall, this proportion is close to 50%. There is some variation between 
countries: 64% of Finnish companies and 63% of French companies would benefit. At the other 
extreme, only 33% of Greek companies would benefit.  
 
The remainder of the table separates companies that would gain or lose from the reform. The next 
two columns show the mean tax liability under the existing system and estimated under the 
reformed system of groups that gain from the reform. On average the gain across all groups that 
would benefit is around 5 percent of their existing tax liability. Again this varies across countries, with 
companies based in the new member states benefitting particularly. US companies that would gain 
would have an average benefit of around 6 percent. 
 
The next section of the Table considers the case of groups that would lose under the reform, i.e. face 
a higher tax burden if the tax burden were calculated according to the CCCTB rules. On average these 
tend to be smaller companies, with tax liabilities roughly half of the first group. One reason is that 
smaller companies are less likely to have at least one subsidiary with an unused loss under the 
existing system. These companies would, on average, see their tax liabilities rise by around 9 percent 
if they were required to be taxed under the CCCTB. The average rise for such US companies would be 
over 15 percent.  
 
Among the individual EU Member States there would also be winners and losers, although this result 
needs to be interpreted with caution because it is based on a small number of companies. In line 
with previous studies, Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic or 
Romania would benefit from increased revenues while the high tax countries like Germany, Spain or 
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Italy would lose significantly. The overall reduction in tax revenues in all countries is approximately 
2.5 percent in our sample (about half the companies would save 5.2 percent on average), with 
individual countries losing or gaining up to 20 percent of their tax revenue.  
 
 
4. How would the future investment of US companies be affected? 
 
The previous section was to some extent an ex-post analysis, identifying which companies would gain 
from the CCCTB, assuming unchanged behaviour. Clearly, though, the introduction of the CCCTB 
could change behavior. We now address this issue indirectly by assessing its impact on investment 
incentives. Given the optional nature of the CCCTB, companies would be able to choose not only 
where to locate a new investment (and how much to invest), but under which system they would 
prefer to be taxed.   
 
Below, we address this by reporting forward-looking measures of effective tax rates. However, 
before doing so, we consider the building blocks of those measures: the statutory tax rate and the 
present value of depreciation allowances, expressed as a proportion of an asset’s initial cost. Here we 
use depreciation allowances as a proxy for the size of the tax base; this clearly excludes other factors 
such as restrictions on interest deductibility and other anti-abuse provisions; we discuss those 
further below.  
 
The first column of Table 6 reports current EU statutory corporate rates, including applicable local 
profit taxes. The remaining three columns present, in turn, the present value of depreciation 
allowances for industrial buildings, plant and machinery and patents, and the last column presents an 
unweighted average of the three. Each row presents values for a given country; the last two rows 
present the net present value for the proposed CCCTB and the unweighted average of the current 
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systems across the 27 countries. Comparing these last two rows, it is clear that the depreciation 
allowances offered under the CCCTB would be, on average, less generous than those currently 
existing within the EU. This does not hold for all individual countries; for example, the tax 
depreciation for industrial buildings in the UK falls substantially short of that in the CCCTB.24
 
 As a 
result, the decision of a company as to whether or not to opt for the CCCTB system will depend, 
among other things, on existing provisions in each country and the asset mix of a company’s 
investment.  
We combine these measures of the statutory rate and the tax base into two measures of effective 
tax rates: an effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and an effective average tax rate (EATR). The first is a 
conventional way of measuring the increase in the cost of capital due to taxation. In principle, a rise 
in the cost of capital or EMTR would tend to reduce aggregate investment undertaken. The second is 
essentially a measure of the economic rent taken in tax, which in principle affects the location of 
discrete investment projects. Both measures are constructed using the approach of Devereux and 
Griffith (1998). Table 7 reports these measures both under existing tax systems, and under the 
CCCTB. Details of the parameters used are based on the financial information in the ORBIS sample, 
and are shown in the note to the Table.  
 
On these measures, the introduction of the CCCTB would increase the average EATR in the EU slightly 
from 24.4 percent to 25.1 percent. The rise in the EMTR would be more pronounced at 4.5 
percentage points. This larger rise in the EMTR occurs because the EMTR is more sensitive to the 
definition of the tax base, since it applies to a marginal investment. Note that the EMTR is negative 
for all countries – a result that hinges on the assumption that two thirds of the investment is 
financed by debt. This assumption is based on our ORBIS sample which has an average debt to total 
                                                          
24 In fact the UK is currently phasing out depreciation allowances for industrial buildings. Starting with fiscal 
year 2011/12 industrial buildings will no longer be tax depreciable, hence the net present value will be zero.  
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assets ratio of about 66 percent. There are clearly differences in the effects of the CCCTB across 
countries. However, these are relatively small.  
 
In practice we may expect to see greater differences in the effects of the CCCTB across individual 
companies, with different debt levels and asset mix. In principle, firm-specific measures could be 
constructed along the approach of Egger et al. (2008) and Egger and Loretz (2010), using firm-specific 
weights. However, this approach on its own would not distinguish the effects of taxation on 
investment by a US company from investment by a European company.  
 
It seems likely that there would be two main differences in the effects for US and European 
companies. First, if an existing company invests in an EU country it may well face start-up losses, and 
indeed with some probability may end up making an overall loss. If that existing company is in the EU 
and has existing taxable profit, then under the CCCTB the losses would be consolidated with the 
existing taxable profit, and would in effect receive immediate loss offset. This would also be the case 
for a US multinational that was already established in the EU and also had existing taxable profit in 
the EU. However, a new venture into Europe by a US company would not, in general, receive such 
favorable treatment of losses. Thus, the possibility of consolidation of losses in one country with 
profit in another country is advantageous only to the extent that the multinational already has 
existing EU profit.  
 
Beyond this, a more complex effect applies to inbound investment. That is because it is not proposed 
that there should be harmonization of withholding taxes on dividends, interest or royalties paid to 
non-EU parents or other non-EU members of the group. For a purely European company this may 
make little difference since its profits would remain in the CCCTB area, and no withholding taxes 
would be charged. But for a US company, incentives would remain to make payments of dividends, 
interest or royalties from an EU country with low or zero withholding tax rates. This is likely to give 
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rise to continuing tax planning opportunities for US companies - in particular, there may be an 
incentive for such companies to shift profits within the EU to take advantage of favorable 
withholding tax rates.  
 
At first sight, it may appear that avoiding any payment of withholding tax would simply put US 
companies on a par with European companies that would typically not be liable to withholding taxes. 
However, the situation is more complex. US companies could in principle direct payments of 
dividends, interest and royalties to another part of the group in a non-EU low-tax jurisdiction. If the 
recipient also exploited the US “check the box” rules, then the receipt would not be taxed by the US 
until and unless the proceeds were distributed back to the US, and would not therefore be subject to 
the subpart F rules for the taxation of passive foreign income.  
 
Of course, European companies could do likewise. But then the specific anti-abuse rules existing in 
European countries, and proposed for the CCCTB, become important in whether the part of the 
group that receives the payment is taxed by the country of the parent company. Currently, there is 
wide variation in such CFC rules between European companies. Under the CCCTB, these rules would 
be harmonized, and may result in European companies being taxed on such income. If this is indeed 
the case, then it may be that ultimately US companies would have a competitive advantage over 
European companies.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper set out to examine the likely impact on incentives for US companies to invest in the EU 
following the European Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide corporation tax based on formula 
apportionment. A significant complication in assessing this is the extent to which US companies 
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engage in tax planning under the existing systems. We therefore first address that issue directly, by 
considering the structure of the EU operations of US companies and by comparing  their European 
effective tax rates to those of European companies. We do not find that, on average, US companies 
successfully engage in sophisticated tax planning, or that they have significantly lower effective tax 
rates than European companies. However, there is evidence that some companies arrange their 
affairs with a strategic tax planning motive. For example, we find some evidence that larger US 
companies make use of the favorable Dutch tax regime to reduce their overall European liabilities. 
 
We also consider whether both US and European companies would be likely to choose to the option 
of being taxed under the new system. Again we find mixed results: roughly half of US companies 
would gain from the new system assuming unchanged behaviour. Others would only benefit if they 
could adjust their location, investment and financing strategies to take account of the new system. 
This is similar to the position for European companies.  
 
However, this assessment depends crucially on the details of the taxation of foreign passive income. 
While there may be some advantage to European companies from consolidating profits and loss in 
different EU countries, US companies may continue to benefit from the “check the box” system 
which effectively permits them to receive passive income in a low-taxed jurisdiction tax-free, and 
hence creates an incentive to pay such income from European counties. However, since this 
possibility appears to exist for US companies at present, it is perhaps surprising that the data do not 
indicate that US companies face relatively low effective tax rates in the EU.  
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Table 1. Number of subsidiaries in row country with immediate (foreign) parent in column country, and ultimately owned by a US parent 
 
AT BE CY CZ DE DK ES FI FR GB HU IE IT LU LV MT NL PL PT SE SK 
Non-
EU US Total 
Per 
cent 
AT 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 10 19 0.2 
BE 0 0 0 0 4 5 4 0 18 19 0 3 3 8 0 0 67 0 1 3 0 13 378 526 5.2 
BG 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 31 39 0.4 
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.0 
CZ 6 4 0 0 20 0 3 0 8 9 0 2 1 7 0 0 54 1 0 1 2 10 129 257 2.5 
DE 1 13 0 0 0 9 5 1 20 59 0 15 8 22 0 0 115 0 0 5 0 47 831 1,151 11.4 
DK 0 2 0 0 5 0 1 1 1 6 0 0 0 4 0 0 24 0 0 9 0 6 127 186 1.8 
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 36 47 0.5 
ES 1 13 0 0 24 6 0 1 27 54 0 9 8 13 0 0 103 0 0 4 0 30 387 680 6.7 
FI 1 1 0 0 6 8 2 0 1 5 0 0 2 3 0 0 17 0 0 22 0 7 135 210 2.1 
FR 0 31 0 0 26 10 15 1 0 55 0 5 4 14 0 0 89 0 0 7 0 26 895 1,178 11.7 
GB 3 12 5 0 48 14 12 3 23 0 0 42 3 50 0 0 204 1 0 12 0 131 2,400 2,963 29.4 
GR 0 3 0 0 2 1 3 0 7 5 0 2 2 1 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 6 41 90 0.9 
HU 1 2 0 0 4 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 1 0 2 45 68 0.7 
IE 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 35 0 0 0 13 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 16 353 447 4.4 
IT 0 9 0 0 16 4 9 1 37 35 0 8 0 8 0 0 81 0 0 3 0 26 365 602 6.0 
LT 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 3 15 25 0.2 
LU 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 58 66 0.7 
LV 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 26 32 0.3 
NL 1 8 0 1 12 6 14 0 7 22 1 9 1 24 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 30 353 491 4.9 
PL 4 8 0 0 30 3 3 2 20 16 1 1 7 14 0 0 75 0 0 3 0 14 209 410 4.1 
PT 0 2 0 0 4 0 22 0 6 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 24 0 0 1 0 4 62 132 1.3 
RO 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 47 62 0.6 
SE 1 8 0 0 1 13 0 8 2 12 0 1 1 2 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 9 244 332 3.3 
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 8 0.1 
SK 2 0 1 3 2 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 4 3 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 3 31 68 0.7 
Total 21 117 7 4 212 85 101 24 184 345 2 97 45 191 1 1 970 4 1 75 2 386 7,215 10,090 100.0 
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Table 2a. Proportion of US companies with a subsidiary in the column country that also have a subsidiary in a row country 
 
 
no AT BE BG CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LT LU LV NL PL PT RO SE SI SK 
AT 21 1 0.33 0.1 0.48 0.81 0.24 0.1 0.67 0.29 0.71 0.86 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.52 0.05 0.14 0.1 0.52 0.57 0.19 0.19 0.52 0.05 0.1 
BE 373 0.02 1 0.03 0.3 0.56 0.22 0.04 0.54 0.26 0.66 0.78 0.14 0.11 0.31 0.52 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.5 0.36 0.17 0.09 0.4 0.02 0.08 
BG 38 0.05 0.34 1 0.32 0.39 0.21 0.11 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.42 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.39 0.05 0.11 
CZ 215 0.05 0.53 0.06 1 0.61 0.26 0.06 0.57 0.3 0.6 0.79 0.19 0.17 0.36 0.55 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.53 0.52 0.2 0.16 0.42 0.03 0.15 
DE 1008 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.13 1 0.11 0.02 0.28 0.12 0.37 0.52 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.04 
DK 167 0.03 0.49 0.05 0.33 0.66 1 0.07 0.53 0.39 0.59 0.7 0.18 0.17 0.37 0.51 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.49 0.44 0.2 0.11 0.46 0.04 0.14 
EE 45 0.04 0.33 0.09 0.27 0.38 0.24 1 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.44 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.36 0.13 0.13 0.2 0.36 0.38 0.2 0.24 0.31 0.09 0.13 
ES 560 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.22 0.5 0.16 0.03 1 0.18 0.51 0.67 0.1 0.09 0.23 0.4 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.38 0.29 0.14 0.07 0.28 0.01 0.07 
FI 196 0.03 0.49 0.08 0.33 0.64 0.33 0.09 0.51 1 0.63 0.72 0.2 0.15 0.37 0.55 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.47 0.44 0.23 0.12 0.56 0.03 0.11 
FR 975 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.13 0.38 0.1 0.02 0.29 0.13 1 0.54 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.3 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.03 
GB 2501 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.21 1 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.09 0 0.02 
GR 77 0.08 0.66 0.12 0.52 0.65 0.39 0.14 0.75 0.51 0.66 0.74 1 0.31 0.53 0.61 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.6 0.64 0.38 0.27 0.62 0.06 0.21 
HU 63 0.08 0.67 0.1 0.57 0.75 0.44 0.13 0.78 0.48 0.71 0.84 0.38 1 0.49 0.75 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.7 0.65 0.29 0.3 0.62 0.06 0.27 
IE 361 0.02 0.32 0.03 0.21 0.46 0.17 0.04 0.36 0.2 0.48 0.71 0.11 0.09 1 0.36 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.34 0.27 0.13 0.06 0.29 0.02 0.07 
IT 432 0.03 0.45 0.04 0.27 0.63 0.2 0.04 0.52 0.25 0.68 0.76 0.11 0.11 0.3 1 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.45 0.34 0.17 0.09 0.4 0.02 0.08 
LT 23 0.04 0.48 0.22 0.3 0.57 0.35 0.26 0.61 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.57 1 0.09 0.22 0.52 0.48 0.39 0.35 0.57 0.13 0.22 
LU 71 0.04 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.48 0.14 0.08 0.45 0.14 0.49 0.62 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.35 0.03 1 0.04 0.38 0.31 0.13 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.03 
LV 32 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.38 0.47 0.41 0.28 0.41 0.38 0.47 0.56 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.38 0.16 0.09 1 0.44 0.41 0.22 0.28 0.44 0.19 0.19 
NL 486 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.23 0.5 0.17 0.03 0.44 0.19 0.49 0.64 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.4 0.02 0.06 0.03 1 0.3 0.13 0.07 0.28 0.01 0.07 
PL 333 0.04 0.4 0.04 0.34 0.54 0.22 0.05 0.48 0.26 0.55 0.65 0.15 0.12 0.29 0.44 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.44 1 0.16 0.11 0.33 0.02 0.1 
PT 108 0.04 0.59 0.09 0.41 0.71 0.31 0.08 0.71 0.42 0.73 0.75 0.27 0.17 0.43 0.67 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.6 0.49 1 0.18 0.49 0.06 0.15 
RO 53 0.08 0.6 0.15 0.64 0.68 0.36 0.21 0.74 0.43 0.68 0.83 0.4 0.36 0.43 0.7 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.62 0.68 0.36 1 0.58 0.08 0.28 
SE 288 0.04 0.51 0.05 0.32 0.66 0.27 0.05 0.55 0.38 0.71 0.82 0.17 0.14 0.36 0.59 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.47 0.38 0.18 0.11 1 0.02 0.08 
SI 8 0.13 0.88 0.25 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.88 0.63 0.5 0.88 0.88 0.38 0.25 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.88 1 0.25 
SK 57 0.04 0.51 0.07 0.56 0.67 0.4 0.11 0.65 0.39 0.58 0.75 0.28 0.3 0.47 0.63 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.63 0.6 0.28 0.26 0.42 0.04 1 
mean 0.03 0.32 0.03 0.21 0.49 0.16 0.04 0.39 0.19 0.5 0.75 0.1 0.09 0.25 0.36 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.34 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.27 0.02 0.07 
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Table 2b. Proportion of US companies with a subsidiary in the column country that also have a subsidiary in a row country, adjusting for GDP of the column country 
 
 
no AT BE BG CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LT LU LV NL PL PT RO SE SI SK 
AT 21 0 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.15 -0.11 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.33 0.04 0.08 0.29 0.02 0.04 
BE 373 -0.14 0 0.01 0.21 -0.09 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.23 0.00 0.04 
BG 38 -0.12 0.14 0 0.22 -0.06 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.27 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.02 0.06 
CZ 215 -0.14 0.31 0.03 0 -0.08 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.17 -0.03 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.24 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.31 0.08 0.07 0.22 0.00 0.10 
DE 1008 -0.06 0.12 0.00 0.09 0 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.23 -0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.02 
DK 167 -0.16 0.27 0.02 0.23 0.00 0 0.06 0.06 0.27 -0.02 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.25 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.09 
EE 45 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.09 0 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.20 -0.04 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.08 
ES 560 -0.09 0.21 0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0 0.10 0.03 0.24 -0.01 0.04 0.15 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.04 
FI 196 -0.16 0.27 0.05 0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.08 0.03 0 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.25 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.06 
FR 975 -0.06 0.15 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.08 0 0.23 -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 
GB 2501 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0 -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.01 
GR 77 -0.18 0.35 0.08 0.37 -0.11 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.33 -0.06 0.05 0 0.21 0.36 -0.07 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.35 0.20 0.14 0.35 0.02 0.14 
HU 63 -0.20 0.34 0.06 0.41 -0.09 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.29 -0.08 0.10 0.14 0 0.31 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.24 0.35 0.10 0.17 0.33 0.02 0.19 
IE 361 -0.10 0.17 0.01 0.14 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.29 0.00 0.04 0 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.04 
IT 432 -0.12 0.27 0.02 0.19 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.23 -0.02 0.05 0.21 0 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.04 
LT 23 -0.21 0.19 0.18 0.15 -0.06 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.34 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 0.25 0.22 -0.01 0 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.09 0.15 
LU 71 -0.09 0.19 0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.20 -0.05 0.01 0.20 -0.06 0.01 0 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.01 
LV 32 -0.15 0.13 0.02 0.26 -0.05 0.23 0.27 -0.02 0.23 -0.03 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.24 -0.09 0.13 0.05 0 0.11 0.18 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.13 
NL 486 -0.11 0.23 0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.04 
PL 333 -0.11 0.22 0.02 0.26 -0.04 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.20 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.17 0 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.06 
PT 108 -0.19 0.32 0.06 0.29 -0.03 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.24 0 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.09 
RO 53 -0.20 0.27 0.11 0.48 -0.10 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.24 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.37 0.17 0 0.29 0.03 0.20 
SE 288 -0.14 0.30 0.02 0.22 -0.04 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.06 0.03 0 -0.01 0.03 
SI 8 -0.32 0.36 0.17 0.61 0.01 0.36 0.47 -0.06 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.30 0.57 0.03 0.32 0.16 0.71 0.21 0.26 0.43 0.26 0.41 0 0.11 
SK 57 -0.20 0.23 0.03 0.43 -0.07 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.23 -0.11 0.10 0.07 0.21 0.32 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.23 0.34 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.00 0 
mean -0.08 0.16 0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.04 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.03 
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Table 3.  Measures of Effective Tax Rates, by country of ultimate owner 
 
 
Country Observations 
 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝑷𝑳𝑩𝑻 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝟏 
% 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝟐 
 
Austria 271 24.8 29.0 86.5 101.0 
Belgium 1,876 30.5 35.3 86.6 100.2 
Bulgaria 228 11.6 14.0 87.2 105.8 
Cyprus 72 19.9 24.0 85.7 103.1 
Czech Republic 205 19.5 25.2 78.5 100.7 
Germany 2,965 26.0 29.9 77.4 88.7 
Denmark 824 26.1 26.7 93.0 95.5 
Spain 4,230 25.8 31.5 75.7 92.1 
Estonia 98 7.9 9.3 37.6 44.5 
Finland 688 21.8 23.2 77.9 83.3 
France 9,548 31.0 33.2 87.6 93.5 
United Kingdom 5,954 26.1 26.9 87.6 90.2 
Greece 178 22.0 28.7 80.3 104.6 
Hungary 13 16.8 19.4 92.1 107.7 
Ireland 227 20.1 20.9 100.0 104.6 
Italy 4,184 39.8 51.3 108.1 139.2 
Lithuania 81 15.5 17.8 92.5 104.1 
Luxembourg 461 27.3 30.4 84.5 93.8 
Latvia 55 17.5 20.6 99.7 117.7 
Malta 8 25.0 29.9 83.7 98.2 
Netherlands 1,242 28.1 30.9 87.0 95.6 
Non-EU 1,853 27.9 30.2 89.3 96.7 
Poland 480 22.0 26.1 98.6 116.9 
Portugal 809 23.1 31.4 80.2 108.7 
Romania 42 17.4 24.0 83.7 112.4 
Slovak Republic 33 20.8 22.9 98.3 108.6 
Slovenia 38 20.7 23.8 82.5 96.3 
Sweden 3,871 22.3 24.6 79.9 88.2 
United States  1,574 29.7 29.6 95.9 95.5 
Total 42,108 28.2 31.8 87.1 97.9 
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Table 4. Determination of Effective Tax Rates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂1 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂1 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂2 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂2 
𝜏𝑖 0.849 *** 0.850 *** 0.983 *** 0.985 *** 
        
 
0.020 
 
0.020 
 
0.020 
 
0.020 
         Log (total assets) -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.026 *** -0.026 *** -0.028 *** -0.027 *** 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 USA_owner 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.061 *** 0.061 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.010 
 
0.010 
 
0.009 
 
0.009 
 USA*NLD -0.020 ** 0.141 ** -0.008 
 
0.223 *** -0.063 *** 0.421 ** -0.025 
 
0.700 *** 
 
0.008 
 
0.055 
 
0.008 
 
0.054 
 
0.024 
 
0.171 
 
0.024 
 
0.165 
 USA*NLD*size  
  
-0.015 *** 
  
-0.021 *** 
  
-0.045 *** 
  
-0.067 *** 
   
0.005 
   
0.005 
   
0.016 
   
0.015 
 Observations 41,929 
 
41,929 
 
41,929 
 
41,929 
 
41,929 
 
41,929 
 
41,929 
 
41,929 
 adjusted R-
squared 0.227   0.227   0.297   0.297   0.122   0.122   0.153   0.154   
 
All regressions include a full set of dummies representing EU countries in which the group has subsidiaries, and 2-digit NACE industry dummies. 
Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. 
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Table 5. Estimated Effect of Tax Reform on Tax Liabilities  
 
  Percentage 
of groups 
with lower 
tax burden 
Groups gaining from CCCTB Groups not gaining from CCCTB 
 
Nr 
Groups 
Current 
system 
€m 
Consolidation 
& 
Apportionment 
€m 
Benefit in 
percent 
Current 
system 
€m 
Consolidation & 
Apportionment 
€m 
Costs in 
percent 
Austria 89 47.2 16.8 15.9 5.2 25.5 26.3 -3.2 
Belgium 261 56.7 22.5 20.9 7.4 11.9 12.3 -3.1 
Germany 554 48.0 146.0 138.9 4.9 18.5 19.4 -4.6 
Denmark 182 46.2 28.3 27.2 3.9 81.0 84.2 -3.9 
Spain 282 46.8 80.6 78.6 2.5 85.4 92.3 -8.2 
Finland 141 63.8 37.0 35.7 3.6 36.4 38.1 -4.8 
France 635 62.8 136.5 130.3 4.6 46.6 48.9 -5.0 
United Kingdom 450 43.1 157.8 150.2 4.8 108.9 118.9 -9.2 
Greece 12 33.3 6.2 3.8 39.3 23.2 23.8 -2.8 
Ireland 30 43.3 58.4 55.4 5.1 15.6 17.1 -9.3 
Italy 447 58.4 71.3 68.2 4.3 70.8 75.3 -6.4 
Luxembourg 159 44.7 45.8 43.7 4.6 11.5 13.5 -17.4 
Netherlands 307 48.5 43.9 41.5 5.5 19.9 22.2 -11.3 
New Member 
States 61 49.2 42.9 16.8 60.8 9.4 10.4 -11.0 
Non-EU States 695 48.8 34.8 32.8 5.6 27.1 32.1 -18.6 
Portugal 46 37.0 90.4 89.8 0.7 30.2 31.7 -4.8 
Sweden 356 46.3 48.0 45.7 4.9 25.8 28.4 -9.7 
United States 706 51.0 76.2 71.5 6.2 37.9 43.8 -15.4 
Total 5,413 51.1 80.8 76.7 5.2 43.8 47.8 -9.2 
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Table 6. Net present value of depreciation allowances  
 
  
Net present value of depreciation allowances  
(% of initial cost) for 
Country 
Statutory  
tax rate 
Industrial 
buildings 
plant and 
machinery patents 
equally 
weighted 
 
Austria 25.0 38.7 81.1 78.4 66.1 
Belgium 34.0 64.1 84.2 86.8 78.4 
Bulgaria 10.0 47.5 88.1 82.0 72.5 
Cyprus 10.0 47.5 73.5 67.9 62.9 
Czech Republic 19.0 50.3 74.0 84.0 69.5 
Germany 29.4 38.7 73.5 86.8 66.3 
Denmark 25.0 43.5 82.5 100.0 75.3 
Spain 30.0 38.7 81.7 54.3 58.2 
Estonia 21.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Finland 26.0 58.1 91.0 73.5 74.2 
France 34.4 54.3 81.7 86.8 74.3 
United Kingdom 26.0 14.1 77.9 82.5 58.2 
Greece 24.0 67.9 78.6 73.5 73.3 
Hungary 19.0 27.5 96.5 96.5 73.5 
Ireland 12.5 47.5 78.4 73.5 66.4 
Italy 31.3 45.8 75.7 96.5 72.7 
Lithuania 15.0 82.5 90.4 96.5 89.8 
Luxembourg 28.8 47.5 85.3 86.8 73.2 
Latvia 15.0 61.1 90.4 86.8 79.4 
Malta 35.0 35.3 86.8 67.9 63.3 
Netherlands 25.0 38.7 86.8 73.5 66.3 
Poland 19.0 33.4 73.5 86.8 64.6 
Portugal 26.5 54.3 86.5 73.5 71.4 
Romania 16.0 33.4 89.0 85.2 69.2 
Slovak Republic 19.0 60.3 81.0 86.8 76.0 
Slovenia 20.0 38.7 86.8 73.5 66.3 
Sweden 26.3 47.5 88.1 87.4 74.3 
CCCTB 
 
33.4 82.5 62.8 59.6 
Average 23.0 46.8 83.2 81.8 70.6 
Assumptions for discount rate: real interest rate 5 percent, inflation rate 2.5 percent.  
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Table 7. Country-specific investment incentives 
 
 
 
Current system  CCCTB proposal 
Country EATR Cost of capital EMTR EATR Cost of capital EMTR 
 
Austria 25.5 4.6 -9.7 26.7 4.8 -3.4 
Belgium  31.3 4.2 -20.1 34.4 5.0 -0.5 
Bulgaria 13.5 4.5 -10.6 14.2 4.7 -6.9 
Cyprus 14.5 4.7 -5.4 14.2 4.7 -6.9 
Czech Republic 21.4 4.7 -6.5 21.7 4.8 -5.0 
Germany 29.3 4.6 -7.7 30.4 4.9 -2.1 
Denmark 26.4 4.7 -6.5 26.7 4.8 -3.4 
Spain 32.1 5.2 3.3 30.9 4.9 -1.9 
Estonia 29.0 6.2 19.9 23.3 4.8 -4.5 
Finland 27.2 4.7 -6.7 27.6 4.8 -3.1 
France 33.3 4.6 -9.7 34.7 5.0 -0.4 
United Kingdom 28.6 5.1 1.5 27.6 4.8 -3.1 
Greece 24.4 4.5 -11.5 25.9 4.8 -3.7 
Hungary 20.0 4.4 -14.5 21.7 4.8 -5.0 
Ireland 16.1 4.7 -7.2 16.2 4.7 -6.5 
Italy 30.0 4.4 -12.8 32.1 4.9 -1.5 
Lithuania 17.4 4.5 -11.2 18.3 4.7 -5.9 
Luxembourg 27.7 4.3 -15.3 29.9 4.9 -2.3 
Latvia 17.4 4.5 -11.3 18.3 4.7 -5.9 
Malta 33.4 4.6 -9.9 35.2 5.0 -0.1 
Netherlands 25.3 4.5 -11.2 26.7 4.8 -3.4 
Poland 21.1 4.6 -7.8 21.7 4.8 -5.0 
Portugal 26.2 4.4 -13.2 28.0 4.9 -3.0 
Romania 18.6 4.6 -8.8 19.2 4.7 -5.7 
Slovak Republic 20.9 4.6 -9.6 21.7 4.8 -5.0 
Slovenia 21.4 4.5 -10.6 22.5 4.8 -4.8 
Sweden 27.3 4.7 -7.1 27.8 4.9 -3.0 
 
Average 24.4 4.6 -8.2 25.1 4.8 -3.8 
Assumptions: real interest rate 5 percent, inflation rate 2.5 percent, pre tax rate of return (for EATR) 
20 percent, economic depreciation for buildings 3.1 percent, for plant and machinery 17.5 percent, 
for patents 15.35 percent. Asset and financing shares, taken from ORBIS, are 20 percent buildings, 
40 percent inventories, 23 percent machinery, 10 percent patents and 7 percent non-depreciable 
land; and new investment is financed 2/3 by debt and 1/3 by retained earnings.  
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Data Appendix  
We use data from the ORBIS Dataset comprising all very large and large companies. According to the 
criteria of the data provider Bureau Van Dijk this comprises companies which either have operating 
revenues of more than 10 million Euros, total assets of more than 20 million Euros or more than 150 
employees. This leaves us with a total sample of 444,934 firms, of which 191,776 are independent 
companies and 253,158 can be attributed to one of 109,490 different ultimate owners.25
Appendix Table 1: ORBIS sample according to subsidiary country owner type 
 Appendix 
Table 1 displays the geographical distribution of the companies across the 27 EU Member states. The 
last column displays the number of subsidiaries in corporate groups which are ultimately owned by 
an US parent. More than a third of the 15,586 EU subsidiaries of US parents are located in the United 
Kingdom.  
Country Standalone companies Companies within groups owned by US parent 
Austria (AT) 992 589 29 
Belgium (BE) 7,694 8,693 630 
Bulgaria (BG) 1,605 1,436 43 
Cyprus (CY) 269 12 1 
Czech Republic (CZ) 7,069 3,400 263 
Germany (DE) 21,924 33,692 1,824 
Denmark (DK) 3,396 3,763 225 
Estonia (EE) 351 1,414 50 
Spain (ES) 21,940 23,145 936 
Finland (FI) 2,671 4,696 232 
France (FR) 16,516 55,015 2,022 
United Kingdom (GB) 26,536 44,784 5,527 
Greece (GR) 2,321 1,534 98 
Hungary (HU) 3,183 789 71 
Ireland (IE) 2,743 2,989 672 
Italy (IT) 30,973 23,392 740 
Lithuania (LT) 1,123 1,009 27 
Luxembourg (LU) 475 849 95 
Latvia (LV) 839 796 32 
Malta (MT) 346 1 0 
Netherlands (NL) 10,281 7,894 820 
Poland (PL) 11,075 8,656 476 
Portugal (PT) 3,568 4,860 161 
Romania (RO) 5,674 784 64 
Sweden (SE) 5,753 17,735 468 
Slovenia (SI) 261 198 8 
Slovak Republic (SK) 2,198 1,033 72 
Total 191,776 253,158 15,586 
 
                                                          
25 Note that we use information of the immediate shareholder to derive ownership chains and, if the database 
does not report a corporate ultimate owner, we use the highest corporate shareholder.  
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Appendix Table 2 further distinguishes the corporate groups according to their number of 
subsidiaries within the European Union and the number of European countries in which they have 
subsidiaries. Evidently the large majority of corporate groups are purely domestic, with 99,792 
corporate groups which are only active in one country. At the other end of the spectrum there are 
439 corporate groups active in more than 10 EU countries. The lower half of Appendix Table 2 
repeats this exercise for the US owned corporate groups. Again a sizeable proportion is only active in 
one country. The ratio of the corporate groups only active in one country is substantially smaller for 
US owned groups – this is because we do not include purely US domestic groups.  
 
Appendix Table 2: Size distribution and geographical scope of corporate groups 
 
Size distribution and geographical scope of all corporate groups 
 
No. of subsidiaries 
No. of countries 1 2 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 50 51 to 100 more than 100 Total 
1 76,002 21,280 1,837 657 15 1 99,792 
2 0 4,207 547 254 9 1 5,018 
3 to 5 0 1,629 975 504 25 8 3,141 
6 to 10 0 0 376 678 36 10 1,100 
more than 10 0 0 0 276 105 58 439 
Total 76,002 27,116 3,735 2,369 190 78 109,490 
         
Size distribution and geographical scope of US owned corporate groups 
 
No. of subsidiaries 
No. of countries 1 2 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 50 51 to 100 more than 100 Total 
1 2,405 458 25 11 1 0 2,900 
2 0 415 35 7 1 0 458 
3 to 5 0 246 140 31 0 0 417 
6 to 10 0 0 96 143 4 1 244 
more than 10 0 0 0 69 18 5 92 
Total 2,405 1,119 296 261 24 6 4,111 
 
Depending on the data requirements we need to use different subsamples for our different analyses. 
For the analysis in Section 2, we need the information to calculate backward looking effective tax 
rates: the tax charge, and profits – measured as earnings before interest and taxation and the profit 
and losses before taxation. This results in a reduction of the dataset to 41,930 corporate groups, out 
of which 1,587 are owned by US companies. In total this subsample includes 95,900 subsidiaries, 
with a geographical distribution as shown in the first three columns in Appendix Table 3.  
The second half of Appendix Table 3 shows the subsample we use in Section 3, when we restrict that 
the data to further include the information we need comprises the apportionment factors: the 
number of employees, the costs of employees, sales and tangibles assets. Further this sample only 
includes corporate groups with subsidiaries in more than one country, which results in a total 
number of 5,413 corporate groups. 706 of these are owned by US owners.   
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Appendix Table 3: Different sample Sizes 
 
Effective tax rate analysis (Section 2) Loss consolidation and formula apportionment (Section 3) 
Country 
Nr Groups                    
(owner country) Subsidiaries Observations 
Nr Groups                     
(owner country) Subsidiaries Observations 
Austria 267 97 317 89 43 105 
Belgium 
 
1,846 5,220 38,968 261 2,980 16,544 
Germany 3,122 5,554 27,148 554 2,464 7,981 
Denmark 841 1,784 11,889 182 1,037 5,616 
Spain 4,299 11,540 74,053 282 4,987 25,832 
Finland 758 2,087 13,101 141 1,088 5,658 
France 9,588 25,735 177,563 635 11,029 58,766 
United Kingdom 5,959 15,911 106,835 450 6,474 33,874 
Greece 175 552 4,186 12 0 0 
Ireland 205 439 1,415 30 0 0 
Italy 3,520 8,043 59,235 447 4,128 23,763 
Luxembourg 454 124 369 159 35 65 
Netherlands 1,251 1,521 6,929 307 619 2,342 
Portugal 791 1,944 11,942 46 768 2,087 
Sweden  3,923 8,664 66,827 356 3,103 17,628 
Bulgaria 232 640 4,315 
New Member 
States:                         
61 
153 800 
Cyprus 83 2 6 0 0 
Czech Republic 197 1,464 10,038 1,113 5,813 
Estonia 209 619 4,809 193 1,182 
Hungary 13 108 487 0 0 
Lithuania 86 267 1,388 0 0 
Latvia 60 233 1,614 13 55 
Malta 7 0 0 0 0 
Poland 482 2,590 16,518 1,508 6,878 
Romania 41 388 2,960 322 1,926 
Slovak Republic 33 319 1,810 221 900 
Slovenia 37 55 303 10 33 
Non-EU 1,864 n.a. n.a. 695 n.a. n.a. 
USA 1,587 n.a. n.a. 706 n.a. n.a. 
Total 41,930 95,900 645,025 5,413 42,288 217,848 
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